

**Comments of Ambassador Linton Brooks  
Moscow State Institute of International Relations**

**“Cooperative Nonproliferation and U.S.-Russian Cooperation”**

**May 22, 2003**

**Introduction**

Good afternoon and thank you for having me with you today. My name is Linton Brooks, and I am the Administrator of the United States National Nuclear Security Administration. My agency is responsible for keeping the United States nuclear weapons stockpile up to date, reliable and secure. My office also administers a number of international nuclear nonproliferation programs, many of which are implemented cooperatively with your Country.

It is these programs that I wish to speak with you about today, emphasizing three points: first, the international community will not succeed in turning back proliferation threats unless its members can work together, furthering common interests in security and world peace. Second, the United States and Russia can be looked at as a useful example of how countries can cooperate to advance common interests. And finally, I want to talk about how you as individuals can help make your country safer and this world better.

**Cooperative Nonproliferation**

The logical place to start this discussion is by looking at the threat environment and how it has evolved. In your country, the threat of terrorism within your own borders is not a new event; the incident in Izmailovsky Park in 1995, when your authorities were notified that a radiological device – containing cesium-137 -- was left in the woods, is but one example.

And I want to emphasize, the threat of terrorism is not new to the United States; in the years prior to September 11, 2001, the United States was working hard to counter such threats. In the explosion of the flight over Lockerbie, in the 1983 attack on our Marines in a base camp in Lebanon, in many other instances, we have come face to face with terrorist threats against United States interests.

Nor have we been immune from attacks on our own homeland. The 1993 truck bombing at the World Trade Center; the attack on an Oklahoma office building in 1995, and of course September 11, 2001, which was of unprecedented magnitude and devastation, made clear in no uncertain terms the new elements of the danger. We were now dealing with direct attacks on the homeland of the United States, and an enemy that would use any means available to harm us.

At the same time, threats to the nonproliferation system have worsened over the past few years. We see North Korea act brazenly and in complete disregard of its international obligations. We see threats to the system from Iran, Iraq, and others as well.

These tendencies should be of concern to all the international community. They are not "United States" problems or "Russian" problems, but concerns for all civilized nations. So all such nations need to work together, to advance cooperative nonproliferation objectives and turn back common threats to international security.

For its part, the Bush Administration has recognized that proliferation threats need to be addressed in all their dimensions. Countering terrorism is now central to how the Administration plans for national security; preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, by the so-called "rogue" states or by sub-state actors intent on acquiring these assets, is fully integrated into our overall foreign policy and national security infrastructure.

But let me emphasize a key point: Given the breadth of the challenges before the United States, and the fact that these threats are worldwide, *cooperation in suppressing terrorism and countering proliferation should be central elements to how we organize internationally.*

We may in fact be in an era characterized by “cooperative nonproliferation,” at least until we come up with a better name for it. In such an environment, the international community will have to rely on a number of cooperative mechanisms to stem proliferation challenges.

There are many ways that international partners can cooperate to address common security challenges. A particularly important example is the Global Partnership established among the United States, Russia and other G-8 countries in June of 2002. The G-8 states have committed up to \$20 billion over ten years to support cooperative threat reduction efforts, of which half will come from the United States. Russia is also making a major contribution.

We are working hard with your officials to find the best ways to implement our commitments under the Global Partnership, and I am sure that all the issues that need to be worked out will be resolved. This has the potential to be a truly historic achievement, and Russia will prove central to its success.

There are other ways for international partners to cooperate, for example through *formal regimes* such as the International Atomic Energy Agency or voluntary organizations such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The United States and Russia, as depository states for the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, bear a special responsibility for leadership in the multinational arena.

#### **U.S.-Russian Cooperation:**

As I mentioned, a good deal of my organization's nonproliferation work involves cooperative activities with Russia. After the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, it became apparent that the strict level of control over Russia's nuclear materials that existed during the Cold War was seriously eroded. For any number of reasons, steps were needed to better secure this nuclear material – the highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium that could be used to make nuclear weapons.

Over time, it also became apparent that there would be opportunities to take other steps to reduce, eliminate, or otherwise dispose of this material, and to help re-direct Russia's nuclear weapons scientists and engineers away from military work and into peaceful, civilian, industrial applications.

These objectives have guided the cooperative nonproliferation efforts in which the United States and Russia have been engaged for over a decade. I believe this work has been, and continues to be, successful.

This success directly reflects the commitment of your leaders, and ours, to making these programs work, and to pushing hard to accelerate the programs and break down bureaucratic obstacles. Your Minister for Atomic Energy, Alexander Rumyantsev, has established a "special partnership" with Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham and they have made the success of these programs among their top priorities. And they are reflecting a commitment that starts at the very top – on more than one occasion Presidents Putin and Bush have endorsed our cooperative nonproliferation efforts.

So it is thanks to such leadership that our countries have accomplished a number of things:

The United States is purchasing from Russia 500 metric tons of excess highly-enriched uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear

weapons. All that material will be downblended and used in power reactors. To date, 179 metric tons have been downblended – potentially enough for thousands of nuclear weapons.

The United States will soon begin to build key facilities to eliminate 34 metric tons of surplus weapons grade plutonium in the United States – and we are working together on a parallel program in Russia to dispose of similar quantities of surplus Russian plutonium. Together our countries will eliminate enough plutonium to make over 15,000 weapons.

In March, the Secretary and Russian Minister Rummyantsev signed an amendment to the U.S.-Russian plutonium production reactor agreement which will lead to the shutdown of Russia's last three reactors that are still producing weapons-grade plutonium.

We're accelerating and expanding our work to secure nuclear materials here. Since 1993, the security of approximately 222 metric tons of nuclear material has been improved. Next year, we expect to upgrade security on 24 additional metric tons of Russia's nuclear material.

The number of sites where this material is being stored is being reduced. By the end of this year, weapons-usable material from 23 buildings will be removed – dramatically reducing the total number of buildings holding such material. Reducing the number of sites storing this material lowers its vulnerability to attack or sabotage.

In March, Russia and the United States co-hosted a major international conference on the security of radiological sources – the materials that would be used in a so-called “dirty bomb.” Over 750 participants from more than 120 countries attended – far exceeding expectations. Concrete recommendations for work came out of that

conference, and the United States and Russia will work closely to implement those recommendations.

We're continuing our programs to develop commercial projects to employ ex-Soviet weapons scientists. This program has reaped enormous industrial and medical benefits, and continues to grow in new and interesting ways.

The U.S. and Russia should soon sign an agreement to permit the return to Russia of Russian-origin Highly enriched uranium at research reactors and facilities outside Russia, including many in regions of proliferation concern. This will build on the success we have already had in jointly returning such material from the former Yugoslavia.

Together we're researching several technical areas with critical national security implications, including nuclear warhead safety and security, nuclear-related counter-terrorism, and other areas. We're developing nuclear materials detectors, explosive containment chambers that will assist in efforts to disable potential terrorist devices, and many other practical applications. We're pursuing nearly fifty projects under this initiative, and it is paying great dividends.

U.S.-Russian cooperation is based on the mutual interest of both sides to reduce proliferation threats. If other states recognize that they too are potential targets of terrorism, or consider the implications for themselves of allowing fissures in the non-proliferation system to widen, they will have an interest in pursuing such programs.

U.S.-Russian cooperation would not work if our programs were only *assistance* programs, which would create imbalances in the relationships that would doom the programs to failure. Rather, they succeed because

they are true collaborative relationships. They have fixed timetables; are conditional on contractors and partners meeting specific contractual requirements; and deliver technologies and expertise that address specific security threats of concerns to both sides.

In short, the programs work because both sides are committed to their success – out of their own self-interest. That’s a useful principle for others to consider as well.

### **You Can Contribute**

Today I have talked about ambitious multilateral programs and initiatives carried out by high-minded international bodies and governments from all corners of the globe, furthering common interests and beating back proliferation and terrorist threats. That’s the big picture, but just as important is how you as individuals can make a difference in the nonproliferation field.

I have been in this business a long time – all my adult life. I have been fortunate to negotiate major arms control treaties such as START, to serve as an officer in the nuclear navy, to hold the position that I enjoy now. But my generation came of age in a different time than yours, under different circumstances. And time is marching on.

My generation lived in fear that our countries would fight a nuclear war. Yours does not. You are the post-Cold War generation. Your ideas, initiatives and policies will shape the relationship between Russia and its neighbors, between Russia and its future friends and allies and yes, Russia and its adversaries. You will have the unique opportunity to build true and enduring partnerships, including with the United States.

I am hopeful that you will see the cooperative programs that our countries engage in as usefully contributing to the future you will want to build. Our countries work together to remove proliferation threats in Russia now; we should continue such cooperation in the future as well.

To make sure that happens effectively, it will be critical that the next generation – including many of you sitting here today and listening to these remarks – choose a career in nonproliferation. It is not a choice, but a requirement thrust upon you by a dangerous and unpredictable world.

This is key to why my organization – the National Nuclear Security Administration – has teamed up with a major U.S. educational institution to establish a sweeping program of nonproliferation education and training in Russia. This program will help develop and train the next generation of Russian nonproliferation experts. Nonproliferation courses will become part of the regular curriculum of a major technical institution in Tomsk – one that feeds into a number of nuclear facilities in the region. Under this program, other activities at the university and high school level will also be pursued.

I am excited about this program, which will also help train MinAtom managers and mid-career personnel at some key nuclear facilities. In today's world, no country – certainly not mine, certainly not yours – is immune to the array of threats before us. Education is essential to developing sound responses to such threats.

These threats will not be defeated by force alone. The best minds, the best strategists, the best intelligence collectors, the most dedicated individuals, are needed to serve their country in this fight. That's where you come in.

You are studying international relations at a prestigious and world-renowned Institute. You are dedicated to understanding why nations and sub-

state actors do what they do. And my guess is that your interest is more than theoretical. You don't want only to understand the threat; you want to stop it.

You can make a difference. The gravity of the challenges before the international community make clear that there are many opportunities to make positive changes. Such change comes from individuals with ideas, initiative, and dedication. You are such people, and my guess is you are among Russia's elite students and academics. You are the ones that are needed to help make the world a safer place, and I hope you will consider a career in nonproliferation. Your American colleagues are waiting to work with you.

Thank you very much.